The South Korean Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has for the first time stated its position that the localizer (airport azimuth device) atop the concrete hill at Muan International Airport in South Jeolla Province, a key factor in the December 29 Jeju Air disaster, "did not meet regulations."
After previously insisting that it "did not violate any regulations," the Ministry has now reversed its position more than a year after the accident.
While the cause of the accident is still under investigation, the government-provided analysis suggests that had the dam not been there, the casualties would have been less severe. Investigation results also showed that all passengers would have survived if the localizer hill had not existed or if regulations had been followed.
Meanwhile, the Jeju Air Passenger Plane Disaster Bereaved Families Association on December 29th has demanded an apology from the Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Committee (AICRI) regarding the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport-commissioned research report that stated that a concrete mound contributed to the fatal accident.
The council issued a statement on the 8th January this year, stating,
“The Jeju Air passenger plane crash that occurred at Muan Airport on December 29, 2024, was clearly a man-made disaster.”
The bereaved families also demanded the completion of a legal amendment for the independent transfer of the investigation organization, and the disclosure of all investigation data to date to the bereaved families.
According to Rep. Kim Eun-hye of the People Power Party, secretary of the National Assembly's Special Committee for the Investigation of the Truth of the December 29 Passenger Plane Disaster, held on the 8th, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport recently stated to the National Assembly,
"The localizer at Muan Airport did not meet airport safety operation standards, and during the 2020 improvement project, it should have been improved to be more prone to breaking (in the event of a collision) within 240m of the end of the precision approach runway landing strip according to regulations."
Kim Eun-hye: "According to the research report submitted by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, the simulation results show that if there had been no localizer mound at Muan Airport, all passengers would have survived."
Localizers are a key facility that share the direction of an aircraft as it approaches the runway. At Muan Airport, they were installed on a concrete hill. This is the hill where the aircraft crashed during the accident. Immediately after the accident, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport stated,
"Muan Airport's terminal safety zone is 199 meters, exceeding the standard of 'at least 150 meters from the end of the runway,' so the localizers outside this area were installed in compliance with regulations."
The terminal safety zone was the biggest point of contention in this incident. According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's
"Airport Safety Operation Standards" (notification), established in 2003 by the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (predecessor to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport),
"Facilities and equipment necessary for navigation within 240 meters of the terminal edge of the landing strip must be fragile and installed as low as possible." This requirement went into effect in 2010.
Muan Airport, which opened in 2007, installed a concrete mound localizer 199 meters from the end of the runway. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport explained that this did not violate regulations, stating, "The notice was implemented in 2010, following the construction of Muan Airport in 2007" (in a briefing on January 7th of last year). They argued that this facility was installed before the notice went into effect, and therefore did not violate regulations.
Even if this argument is accepted, the fact that the concrete hill was not improved during the 2020 localizer improvement project remains a point of contention.
Despite the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Korea Airports Corporation including the phrase "Review of measures to ensure frangibility" in the design service bidding notice, Muan Airport did not change the concrete hill to a frangible state.
In this regard, Rep. Kim asserted that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's inadequate verification was revealed based on meeting minutes from the time of the localizer upgrade project. Rep. Kim stated,
"Although Muan Airport announced at the time that it would maintain the localizer facility as a concrete structure, no one raised objections to the need to replace it with a more fragile structure."
Rep. Kim said of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's reversal of position,
"This can be seen as an admission of responsibility that measures such as facility improvements should have been taken for safety during the 2020 localizer facility improvement project," but added, "The government will need to be held strictly accountable for condoning and neglecting this."
"If there were no hills or they were easy to break, everyone would survive."
Just before the Jeju Air flight disaster on December 29, the pilot's desperate attempts to avoid a flock of birds were confirmed through the black box, but the pilot ultimately collided with the aircraft.
SBS reported on 9th January 2026, the interim investigation report of the Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Committee under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
The report contained the interim findings of the Accident Investigation Board's investigation into the disaster, including the collision between the aircraft and birds, the installation of the concrete dam, aircraft defects, and the pilot's response. In particular, it included previously unreleased analysis of the black box from the plane.
The Accident Investigation Board (ACC) analyzed the flight data recorder (FDR) and engine electronic control unit (EEC) and found that the number 1 engine stopped 11 seconds after the pilots declared the engine off, but the number 2 engine continued to run until the plane hit the ground.
After a thorough investigation with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Boeing, the ACC concluded that both engines "did not exhibit engine defects in the past 14 flights or in the flight at the time of the accident."
Regarding the concrete berm, the ACC stated that
"we confirmed that it did not meet airport installation standards," and that the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board responded that because an explosion and fire occurred simultaneously immediately after impact with the berm, "it cannot be classified as a survivable accident."
Meanwhile, Rep. Kim also stated on the same day, "According to a research report submitted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Commission (ARIAC), a simulation of what would have happened if the localizer hill had not been installed at Muan Airport concluded that all passengers would have survived."
This is based on a report commissioned by the ARIAC to the Korea Institute of Computational Structural Engineering in March of last year.
In particular, a simulation that assumed the localizer hill had been modified from concrete to a "fragile" structure also estimated that there would have been no serious injuries.
While not a definitive result, this analysis lends credence to the bereaved families' interpretation that the concrete hill exacerbated the disaster. Rep. Kim stated, "We must uncover the truth behind how a hill, intended to be fragile, became a deadly pass."
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